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COMMENTS
ABANDONING TRIAL BY ORDEAL:
MISSOURI'S NEW VIDEOTAPING
STATUTE
'There oft are heard the tones of infant woe'
'The short thick sob, loud scream, and shriller squall.'
Alexander Pope
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of child sexual abuse is one of alarming dimensions., Media
coverage has led not only to an increased awareness of the pervasive nature
of the problem2 but also to an understanding of the inherent difficulties in
developing meaningful solutions.3 The tragedy of child abuse lies not only
in the physical acts committed against the child, but also in the potential
long term psychological harm which frequently occurs. 4 Unfortunately, it is
often the societal and legal responses to the abuse which create longer and
1. Statistical reports on the number of sexually abused children vary consid-
erably. One weekly magazine estimated that the number of children who are sexually
abused range from 100,000 to 500,000 per year. Watson, Lubenow, Greenberg, King
& Junkin, A Hidden Epidemic, NEWSWEEK, May 14, 1984, at 30. Most agree that
incidents of child abuse are underreported. See Note, The Constitutionality of the
Use of Two- Way Closed Circuit Television to Take Testimony of Child Victims of
Sex Crimes, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 995, 996 (1985). Recently, however, there has been
a significant increase in the reporting of sexual abuse cases. According to a study by
the National Committee for the Prevention of Child Abuse, Missouri had a 100%70
increase in reported cases. Child Abuse Reports Soar, L.A. Times, Feb. 17, 1985, at
2, col. 1.
2. The McMartin preschool case, which arose in the fall of 1983 in Manhattan
Beach, California, is an example of the intense publicity which has recently surrounded
child sexual abuse cases.
3. See generally Graham, Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: Hearsay and
Confrontation Clause Issues, in PAPERS FROM A NATIONAL POLICY CONFERENCE ON
LEGAL REFORMS IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 157 (1985); Comment, The Young
Victim as Witness for the Prosecution: Another Form of Abuse?, 89 DICK. L. REV.
721, 732 (1985); Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions:
Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARv. L. REV. 806 (1985).
4. See M. DE YOUNG, THE SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF CHILDREN 46-160 (1982);
Note, supra note 1. at 1000-01.
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more severe psychological problems for these children than the abuse itself.'
Frequently the criminal justice system is responsible for contributing to the
trauma a child may experience. The young victim is asked to explain con-
fusing, embarrassing, and terrifying details of the abuse perpetrated against
her. In many cases the child must participate in numerous interrogations; 6
in extreme cases the child may be interviewed and cross-examined up to
fifteen times before reaching trial.7 Many believe this repeated recollection
of the abuse may cause significant harm. 8 Finally, the child must testify in
an intimidating courtroom, 9 face the accused, and again recite the events of
the abuse.' 0
Described as "legal process trauma,"" this additional stress can be
devastating to both the child and the success of the prosecution. 2 Parents,
for example, frequently withdraw their children from litigation to protect
5. Psychologists agree that the victim's treatment after the discovery of the
offense may lead to more trauma than the offense itself. According to one study, the
victims of sexual abuse who were involved in criminal proceedings had a much longer
recovery time than those victims who were not so involved. See J. BuLKLEY & H. DAVID-
SON, CHILD SExuAL ABUSE: LEGAL IssUEs AND APPROACHES 3-4 (1982); Libai, The Protec-
tion of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice System, 15
WAYNE L. REV. 977, 980-81 (1969); Parker, The Rights of Child Witnesses: Is the
Court a Protector or Perpetrator?, 17 NEW ENG. L. REV. 643, 643-53 (1982); Com-
ment, Child Witnesses in Sexual Abuse Criminal Proceedings: Their Capabilities,
Special Problems and Proposals for Reform, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 157, 164 (1985).
6. In most jurisdictions, the youngster will be questioned by police and the
prosecuting attorney and must testify at preliminary and grand jury hearings before
ever reaching trial. See Note, supra note 1, at 1001 n.25. In one case, a child was
examined and cross-examined for over fourteen hours. J. BULKLEY & H. DAVIDSON,
supra note 5, at 4. One solution used in Seattle, Washington is to interview the child
in the attorney's interviewing room which is filled with books, toys, and games. The
idea is to make the child comfortable. Parents and other interested parties can observe
the interview through a two-way mirror. See Meyers, Little Witnesses, STUDENT LAW.,
Sept. 1982, at 14, 50.
7. See Girdner, Out of the Mouths of Babes, CAL. LAW., June 1985, at 57,
59.
8. See Haas, The Use of Videotape in Child Abuse Cases, 8 NovA L.J. 373,
373 (1984).
9. See Libai, supra note 5, at 1014; Parker, supra note 5, at 651-53; Com-
ment, Confronting Child Victims of Sex Abuse: The Unconstitutionality of the Sexual
Abuse Hearsay Exception, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 387, 387 (1984).
10. See Libai, supra note 5, at 984; Parker, supra note 5, at 651; Note, supra
note 1, at 1001.
11. Psychologist David Libai used the phrase "legal process trauma" to de-
scribe the impact on child victims of sexual abuse who participate in criminal pros-
ecutions. See Libai, supra note 5, at 983.
12. Not all agree that children suffer additional stress from testifying. See,
Berliner, The Child Witness: The Progress and Emerging Limitations in PAPERS FROM
A NATIONAL POLICY CONFERENCE ON LEGAL REFORMS IN CHILD SExUAL ABUSE 93, 102
(1985). ("[Tlhere is no reliable evidence to conclude that children in general cannot
testify effectively in court or that they are universally traumatized by the experience.
In fact the opposite seems to be true.").
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them from further trauma.'3 In cases where the parents and child agree
to participate, the trauma of the abuse may heighten problems usually as-
sociated with child witnesses.' 4 Reliable, competent testimony of a child
witness is often difficult to obtain,' 5 but in a sexual abuse case the child
may become even more withdrawn and uncooperative, more forgetful, and
more easily confused.' 6 This is a crucial problem in sexual abuse cases since
the child is normally the only witness to the crime; consequently the child's
testimony may be the only basis for prosecution.' 7 Until recently the legal
system was ill-equipped to deal with the special problem of children who
were victims of sexual abuse. Recognition of this problem, however, has
led to a host of reforms designed to facilitate prosecution and to protect
the children who must testify at trial. These reforms include an expanded
hearsay exception,' 8 a presumption of competency,' 9 use of closed circuit
13. See Parker, The Child Witness Versus the Press: A Proposed Legislative
Response to Globe v. Superior Court, 47 ALB. L. REV. 408, 410-12 (1983); Note,
supra note 1, at 997.
14. See Meyers, supra note 6, at 16 (child may combine fact and imagination);
Comment, Evidentiary Problems in Criminal Child Abuse Prosecutions, 63 GEo. L.J.
257, 267-68 (1974) (testimony by child may be influenced by parents); Note, supra
note 1, at 997-98.
15. The problem of whether a child is competent to testify is a separate issue.
Missouri, which normally applies the presumption that a child who is above the age
of ten is competent, Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.060 (Supp. 1985), has recognized the need
for a child's testimony in sexual abuse cases by adopting an exception for these cases.
See C.R.K. v. H.J.K., 672 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). See generally
Melton, Children's Competency to Testify, 5 LAW AND Hum. BEHAV. 73 (1981)
(discussion of competency).
16. See Note, supra note 3, at 807.
17. See McGrath & Clemens, The Child Victim as Witness in Sexual Abuse
Cases, 46 MONT. L. REV. 229, 230 (1985); Comment, supra note 3, at 731.
18. States which have enacted hearsay exception statutes include the following:
Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 12.40.110 (Supp. 1986); Arizona: ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-1416 (1985); Arkansas: ARK. R. EvID. 803(25)(A); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-3-411(3) (Supp. 1985); Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(23) (West Supp. 1986);
Illinois: Juvenile Court Act, 1981 Ill. Laws 82-223, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 704-
6(4)(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (Burns Supp.
1986); Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.96(6) (West 1985) (juvenile court only); Kansas:
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (1985); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(3)
(West Supp. 1986); Missouri: Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.075 (1986); Nevada: NEV. REV.
STAT. § 51.385 (1985) (cases only); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-69 (Supp.
1986) (custody or parental termination cases only); South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 19-16-38 (Supp. 1986); Texas: TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.072
(Vernon Supp. 1986); TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 54.031 (Vernon 1986); Vermont: VT.
R. EvID. 804(a); Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (Supp. 1986).
For discussion of hearsay statutes, see McNeil, The Admissibility of Child Victim
Hearsay in Kansas: A Defense Perspective, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 265 (1984); Note,
Sexual Abuse of Children- Washington's New Hearsay Exception, 58 WASH. L. REV.
813 (1983). See also Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends in State Legislation
and Other Emerging Legal Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 89 DICK. L. REV.
645 (1985).
19. The following statutes set up the presumption of competency: Arizona:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2202 (1982); Arkansas: ARK. R. EvID. 601; Colorado:
1986]
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television,20 and provisions for videotaping. 2' Missouri has joined in this
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-106(1)(b) (Supp. 1985); Connecticut: 1985 Conn. Acts
85-587 (Reg. Sess.); Delaware: DEL. R. Evin. 601; Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. §
90.601 (West 1979); Maine: ME. R. EvID. 601; Maryland: MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 9-103 (Supp. 1986); Michigan: MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2163
(1986); Mississippi: Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-3 (1972); Missouri: Mo. REV. STAT. §
491.060(2) (Supp. 1986); Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-601 (1985); New Jersey:
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-1 (West 1976); New Mexico: N.M. R. Evrn. 601; North
Dakota: N.D. R. Evm. 601; Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 12-2601 (West
1980); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 40.310 (1985); Pennsylvania: 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5911 (Purdon 1982); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-101 (Supp. 1986);
Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-2 (Supp. 1986); Washington: WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 5.60.050 (1963); Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. ANN. § 906.01 (West 1975); Wyoming:
Wyo. R. EvID. 601.
20. The following statutes deal with closed circuit television: Alabama: 1985
Ala. Acts 85-743; California: CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp. 1986); Con-
necticut: 1985 Conn. Acts 85-587 (Reg. Sess.); Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.54
(West Supp. 1986); Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1986); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:283 (West Supp. 1986); Maryland:
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1986); New Jersey: N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4 (Vest 1986); New York: N.Y. CraM. PROC. LAW § 65.00-.30
(McKinney Supp. 1986); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1986);
Texas: TEX. CRtM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1986); Utah: UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5 (Supp. 1986); Vermont: VT. R. EvID. 807(e).
21. States which presently have legislation on videotaped testimony include:
Alabama: 1985 Ala. Acts 85-743; Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.047 (1984); Arizona:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253 (1985); Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2035 to
-2037 (Supp. 1985); California: CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1986); Colo-
rado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413 (Supp. 1985); Connecticut: 1985 Conn. Acts 85-
587 (Reg. Sess.); Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3511 (Supp. 1985); Florida:
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.53 (West Supp. 1986); Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
421.350 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
1205 (Supp. 1986); Missouri: Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.675-.693 (1986); Montana: MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-15-401 to -15-403 (1977); Nevada: 1985 NEV. REV. STAT. § 1423; New
Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a (1985); New Mexico: N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-9-17 (1984); New York: N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.32 (McKinney Supp.
1986); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.1 (Supp. 1986); South Dakota: S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-9 (Supp. 1986); Texas: TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1986); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5 (Supp. 1986);
Vermont: VT. R. Evm. 807; Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. ANN. § 967.04(7) (West Supp.
1986).
In addition to these statutes, a number of alternative proposals have been suggested.
These include a tender years exception to the rule against hearsay, see Note, A Tender
Years Doctrine for the Juvenile Courts: An Effective Way to Protect the Sexually
Abused Child, 61 U. DET. J. URB. L. 249 (1984); closure of the courtroom, see
Parker, supra note 5; an integrated statutory scheme combining hearsay and video-
taping statutes, see Note, supra note 3; exclusion of spectators, see Whitcomb, As-
sisting Child Victims in the Courts: The Practical Side of Legislative Reform in PAPERS
FROM A NATIONAL POLICY CONFERENCE ON LEGAL REFORMS IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
CASES 13, 17 (1985) (at least twenty states have passed laws barring some portion of
the audience from the courtroom during the testimony of a sexual abuse victim).
Some courts allow the defendant to be hidden from the child's view, State v. Strable,
313 N.W.2d 497 (Iowa 1981); others have held such a procedure violates the defend-
ant's right of confrontation. Herbert v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 172
4
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movement, and in July 1985 the 83rd General Assembly passed the "Child
Victim Witness Protection Law" which permits the use of videotaped tes-
timony.22
Cal. Rptr. 850 (1981). In Los Angeles County Dependency Court young victims of
abuse are shown a short film entitled, "Hey, What Am I Doing Here?," which was
designed to explain what happens during trial. Meyers, supra note 6, at 15.
22. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 491.675-.693 (1986). The statute in full provides:
491.675. Citation of sections 491.675 to 491.693
The provisions of sections 491.675 to 491.693 shall be known and may be
cited as the "Child Victim Witness Protection Law."
491.678. Child defined
For purposes of sections 491.675 to 491.693, the term "child" means a
person under seventeen years of age who is the alleged victim in any criminal
prosecution under chapter 565, 566 or 568, RSMo.
491.680. Court may order video recording of alleged child victim, when-
procedure- transcript of testimony-cross-examination
1. In any criminal prosecution under the provisions of chapter 565, 566 or
568, RSMo, involving an alleged child victim, upon the motion of the pros-
ecuting attorney, the court may order that an in-camera videotaped recording
of the testimony of the alleged child victim be made for use as substantive
evidence at preliminary hearings and at trial.
2. In determining whether or not to allow such motion, the court shall
consider the elements of the offense charged and the emotional or psycho-
logical trauma to the child if required to testify in open court or to be
brought into the personal presence of the defendant. Such recording shall
be retained by the prosecuting attorney and shall be admissible in lieu of
the child's personal appearance and testimony at preliminary hearings and
at trial, conflicting provisions of section 544.270, RSMo, notwithstanding.
A transcript of such testimony shall be made as soon as possible after the
completion of such deposition and shall be provided to the defendant to-
gether with all other discoverable materials.
3. The court shall preside over the depositions, which shall be conducted in
accordance with the rules of evidence applicable to criminal cases.
4. The attorney for the defendant shall have at least two opportunities to
cross-examine the deposed alleged child victim; once prior to the preliminary
hearing and at least one additional time prior to the trial.
5. Prior to the taking of the deposition which is to be used as substantive
evidence at the trial pursuant to sections 491.675 to 491.693, the defendant's
attorney shall be provided with such discoverable materials and information
as the court may, on motion, direct; shall be afforded a reasonable time to
examine such materials; and shall be permitted to cross-examine the child
during the deposition.
6. If the defendant is not represented by counsel and if, upon inquiry, it
appears to the court that the defendant will be unable to obtain counsel
within a reasonable period of time, the court shall appoint the public de-
fender or other counsel to represent the defendant at the deposition.
491.685. Defendant may be excluded from child victim deposition pro-
ceedings, when
1. On motion of the prosecuting attorney, the court may exclude the defend-
ant from any or all deposition proceedings at which the child is to testify.
However, where any such order of exclusion is entered, the child shall not
be excused as a witness until the defendant has had a reasonable opportunity
to review the videotape recording in private with his counsel and to consult
19861
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Missouri's statute provides that the court may order an in-camera video-
taped recording" of a child 4 who is a victim of a crime .2 The statute instructs
the court to look at the elements of the offense charged and the emotional
or psychological trauma the child would suffer if required to testify in court
or be brought in the presence of the defendant. 26 The court has the power
to exclude the defendant from the deposition proceedings 27 and may sequester
the child from the view of the defendant. 28 The defendant's attorney is given
two opportunities to cross-examine this witness, 29 and before the videotaped
with his counsel; and until his counsel has been afforded the opportunity
to cross-examine the child following such review and consultation.
2. The court may also order, on motion of the prosecuting attorney, during
all predeposition procedures, recesses, and post-deposition matters that the
child be sequestered from the view and presence of the defendant.
3. In no event shall the child's videotaped testimony be admitted into evi-
dence until the defendant and his attorney have been afforded a reasonable
opportunity to review the videotape in private in the presence of each other.
491.687. Court may order videotaped reexamination, when
At any time prior to trial, and for good cause shown, the court may, upon
motion of any party, order a videotaped reexamination of the child where
the interests of justice so require.
491.690. Provisions of sections 491.675 or 491.693 not to apply where
defendant has waived right to counsel-exceptions
Where a defendant has waived the right to counsel and elected to represent
himself, the provisions of sections 491.675 to 491.693 shall not apply, except
in the discretion of the court, under such rules, procedures and restrictions
as the court may, in the interests of justice, impose.
491.693. Testimony to be under oath
All testimony taken under sections 491.675 to 491.693 shall be under oath.
23. Id. § 491.680.1.
24. Id. § 491.678. "Child" for purposes of this act is defined as a person
under seventeen years of age. Id. The age limit appears arbitrarily imposed and is
higher than limits in most other states. According to one commentator, children under
fourteen years of age are generally considered "immature and incapable of making
reasonable judgments concerning sexual relations with adults." Libai, supra note 5,
at 979-80.
25. The statute specifically applies only to criminal prosecutions under the
provisions of Missouri Revised Statutes, Chapters 565, 566, and 568 (1978). Missouri
Revised Statutes Chapter 565 includes murder, manslaughter, assault, and kidnapping.
Missouri Revised Statutes Chapter 566 includes rape, sexual assault, sodomy, deviate
sexual assault, sexual misconduct, and sexual abuse. Missouri Revised Statutes Chap-
ter 568 includes bigamy, incest, abandonment, criminal nonsupport, endangering
welfare, abuse, and unlawful transactions. The focus of this comment is on sexual
offense crimes since this is the area in which the child victim/witness problem is most
acute.
26. Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.680.2. It is unclear whether the prosecution will
have to show by a preponderance of evidence that videotaping is necessary or whether
some other standard will apply. Since the statute requires a finding of emotional
trauma before videotaping can be used, the child may face a battery of psychological
tests by both the state and the defendant.
27. Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.685.1.
28. Id. § 491.685.2.
29. Id. § 491.680.4.
6
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evidence is admitted in evidence, the defendant and his attorney are given
an opportunity to review the tape.30 Missouri's response attempts to resolve
some of the difficulties encountered in prosecuting crimes in which the only
witness is a child who is often fearful, embarrassed, and confused. The
legislation is designed to protect vulnerable children whose emotional well-
being may suffer as a result of the ordeal of testifying in court. However,
this protection may be in direct conflict with important, well-established
rights which protect defendants in criminal proceedings. This Comment ex-
plores the parameters of the Child Victim Witness Protection Law by ex-
amining the tensions created between the need to protect the child from
further trauma in the courtroom and the constitutional rights of the accused.
Challenges to this law can be expected. In order to determine whether this
legislation will survive a constitutional attack, it is necessary to first determine
whether an accommodation of both the state's interests and the defendant's
rights can be made, and if not, whose interests are paramount.
II. RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
The most significant constitutional challenge will be based on the alle-
gation that the statute violates the defendant's right to confront witnesses
and be present at his trial.3 ' The sixth amendment right of confrontation
protects three fundamental concerns. It ensures face-to-face confrontation,32
provides an opportunity for cross-examination,33 and places the demeanor
of the witness before the jury. 4 Closely associated with the right of con-
frontation is the right of the accused to be present during all stages of the
trial. This allows the defendant to participate in his own defense and make
certain his attorney conducts a vigorous defense.35 Unfortunately, it is these
rights which create the most harm to the child victim/witness because the
recital of details of the abuse and the accusation in the presence of the
defendant cause the most emotional damage to the child.
30. Id. § 491.685.1.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides "in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him . . . ." The Sixth Amendment right of confrontation was made binding
on the states in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). See also Mo. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 18 ("[Imn all criminal prosecutions the accused has the right ... to meet the witnesses
against him, face to face .... )
32. See Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899) (physical confrontation is
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment).
33. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974); California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 158 (1970); 5 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1367 (Chadbourn rev.
1974).
34. See Hutchins v. Wainwright, 715 F.2d 512, 516 (11th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1427 (1984); State v. Melendez, 135 Ariz. 390, -, 661 P.2d 654,
657 (Ct. App. 1982) (defendant raised questions as to the ability of videotape to
convey the victim's demeanor and reactions).
35. See Comment, The Criminal Videotape Trial: Serious Constitutional Ques-
tions, 55 OR. L. REV. 567, 568 (1976).
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The Supreme Court has long recognized that the right of confrontation
is not absolute and must occasionally give way to public policy considera-
tions.3 6 Generally two exceptions to this right have been recognized. First,
testimony has been permitted if the accused has waived3 7 or forfeited38 his
confrontation rights. Second, a general hearsay exception exists: when a
witness is actually unavailable, prior testimony may be admitted if sufficient
indicia of reliability are present. 39
Courts may find a forfeiture of confrontation in some child sexual abuse
cases because intimidations and threats are integral parts of the abuse syn-
drome. In most cases the perpetrator uses coercion, threats, and bribes to
ensure secrecy.4 0 It may be difficult to remove from the child's psyche the
force of prior coercion. The threats remain real to young children regardless
of reassurances from adults. Certainly the legislature was concerned about
this very issue since a specific provision of the statute provides for seques-
tration of the victim/witness'.4 Although direct intimidation may be pre-
vented after the accused is charged, the courts may find the lingering effect
of past threats sufficient to warrant an exception to the right of confrontation
given the vulnerability of the child.42
A more likely interpretation is one which places Missouri's statute within
the second general exception. In Ohio v. Roberts, the Court set forth a
two prong test for determining when hearsay evidence should be admitted."3
The first prong requires the prosecutor to make a good faith effort to produce
the witness." If read literally, Missouri's statute fails to meet this requirement
36. See Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911); Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
37. Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 19 (1973) (per curiam) (defendant
voluntarily absent from courtroom waived right to confrontation); United States v.
Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1358 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977)
(defendant waived his confrontation right when he intimidated a witness prior to
trial).
38. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) (held defendant could forfeit
his right to confrontation by misconduct); Rice v. Marshall, 709 F.2d 1100, 1102 (6th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1034 (1984) (no confrontation clause violation to
admit out of court statement of witness who refused to testify at trial when witness'
refusal resulted from threat of violence).
39. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); see also Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408
U.S. 204, 216 (1972).
40. "Child victims are usually persuaded and tricked by known, often trusted
or depended on adults into going along with repeated sexual activity over extended
periods of time." Berliner, supra note 12, at 95.
41. Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.685.2 (1986).
42. In United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979), the court
rejected the notion that the defendant waived his right to be present through mis-
conduct. According to the court, the facts of the case did not suggest that the
defendant's conduct was so heinous as to prevent his physical presence. In Benfield,
however, the victim was an adult victim of kidnapping. Benfield is discussed infra
text accompanying notes 57-68.
43. 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980).
44. A witness is considered unavailable only if the government is unable,
despite a good faith effort, to produce his attendance at trial. Id. Missouri's statute,
522 [Vol. 51
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since in most sexual abuse cases the witness is available. However, the Federal
Rules of Evidence define witness unavailability to include situations in which
the witness is unable to testify because of a physical or mental illness or
infirmity.45 Although the young victim may be technically available to testify,
he or she may be held to be psychologically "unavailable. '46
No standard for determining when a child is "unavailable" is given in
Missouri's statute. The statute provides only that "the court shall consider
the elements of the offense charged and the emotional or psychological trauma
to the child if required to testify in open court or to be brought into the
personal presence of the defendant. ' 47 In other states with videotaping stat-
utes the standard for determining unavailability range from finding that the
child would suffer "moderate emotional or mental harm, '48 or "unreason-
able and unnecessary mental or emotional harm ' 49 if required to testify in
open court. Since all participants suffer some emotional distress while tes-
tifying in court, unavailability should require more than merely establishing
some possibility of psychological distress. 0
A related issue is a timing question: when should unavailability be 'de-
termined? Many state criminal procedure rules require two showings of un-
availability-one at the time of taking the videotape and again when the tape
is shown at trial, since the condition of the witness may have changed. In
United States v. Benfield, the court stated that "an additional showing of
the witness' mental condition and availability on the trial date would have
been a much better practice." 5' It is unclear from Missouri's statute when
the videotaping will occur. If the videotape is used solely as a substitute for
live testimony there is little danger of a change in the child's emotional
condition since the court's decision to permit the videotaping and the taping
like most videotaping statutes, does not require a finding of unavailability. Only three
videotaping statutes require the victim/witness be unavailable. CAL. PENAL CODE §
1346(d) (West Supp. 1986); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 8-3-413(4) (Supp. 1985); S.D. COD-
IFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-9 (Supp. 1985); see also State v. Gettys, 49 Ohio App.
2d 241, 360 N.E.2d 735 (1976) (introduction of a videotaped deposition was uncon-
stitutional unless a showing was made that the witness was unavailable to testify at
trial).
45. See FED. R. EvID. 804(a)(4).
46. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 253, at 753-58 (E. Cleary ed. 3d ed. 1984);
5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 33, § 1411; Bulkley, supra note 18, at 663.
47. Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.680.2 (1986).
48. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.53(1) (West 1986).
49. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-34.1 (Supp. 1982).
50. See Graham, Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation:
Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 19, 83
(1985). In Warren v. United States, 436 A.2d 821, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the court
outlined the following factors relevant in determining psychological unavailability:
"(1) the probability of psychological injury as a result of testifying, (2) the degree
of anticipated injury, (3) the expected duration of the injury, and (4) whether the
expected psychological injury is substantially greater than the reaction of the average
victim." Id.
51. 593 F.2d 815, 817 n.4 (8th Cir. 1979).
9
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itself will occur in a relatively short period of time. If this is the case,
however, the statute fails to address the problem of repeated interrogations.
If, on the other hand, the videotaping does serve as a substitute not only
for live testimony, but also as a device for allowing consolidation of inter-
views, there is the chance the child's mental state may drastically change
from the time of the videotaping to the time of the actual trial.
Missouri's statute is flawed since it contains no standards for determining
when and under what circumstances a child should be declared unavailable
for purposes of permitting the videotaping. The vagueness of the statute is
likely to result in inconsistent applications and may jeopardize the interests
of either the child witness or the accused. Although a certain degree of
flexibility is warranted in order to accommodate the individual needs of each
child witness, the statute should be amended to specifically establish mini-
mum standards and procedures for employing the videotape in order to
protect the rights of the defendant and ensure the integrity of the process.
In addition to showing the declarant is unavailable, the second prong of the
Roberts test requires the evidence bear adequate "indicia of reliability." 52 A
statement is considered reliable if it falls within one of the recognized hearsay
exceptions." Some may interpret Missouri's statute as implicitly creating a
new hearsay exception because it permits the out of court statement of the
child to prove the truth of the matter asserted.1 Unlike some states, however,
the statute makes no mention of hearsay; instead the testimony is essentially
treated as the functional equivalent of testimony at trial. Under either char-
acterization, the videotaped testimony can be admitted only under the same
constraints as other hearsay exceptions.
Since the act falls under no recognized constitutional exception, the
"indicia of reliability" will be found in examining the extent to which the
videotape provisions maintain the functions underlying the right to confron-
tation. To determine the constitutionality of Missouri's statute in this regard
it is necessary to distinguish between those elements of confrontation which
are central to defendant's ability to present and defend his case and those
which are merely secondary.
A. Face-to-face confrontation
Early Supreme Court cases viewed physical confrontation as an essential
52. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
53. Id. FED. R. EvID. 803(24) and 804(b)(5), the "catch all" exceptions to the
hearsay rule, allow admission of evidence when there is a particularized guarantee of
trustworthiness.
54. See FED. R. EvID. 801(c). Children's statements in sexual abuse cases have
frequently been admitted under traditional exceptions to hearsay. See Note, A Com-
prehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 1745, 1756-63 (1983).
10
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element of the sixth amendment." In Barber v. Page, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed this view and held the right to confrontation includes a right to
a face-to-face meeting.56 The belief is that face-to-face confrontation en-
hances recollection and promotes truthful communication.17 The crucial issue
is whether it is constitutional to remove this truth eliciting factor which results
from a face-to-face meeting. In United States v. Benfield, the witness, an
adult woman who was a victim of a kidnapping, suffered psychological
problems "which were directly related to her abduction." 8 The trial court
granted the government's request to take a videotape deposition and ordered
that the defendant not be within her view. The defendant was permitted to
watch the proceedings on a monitor and could interrupt the questioning by
sounding a buzzer which would summon his attorney. The witness was unable
to see the defendant and was unaware the defendant was watching her tes-
timony.59 The court concluded these circumstances abridged the rights of the
defendant.60 According to the court, "[T]he right of cross-examination rein-
forces the importance of physical confrontation." ' 6 The "benign intimida-
tion" theory which operates to elicit truth from an adult, however, may
become malevolent intimidation when the witness is a young child. The stress
of meeting the defendant may lessen the reliability and veracity of the tes-
timony and in many cases a face-to-face meeting may do nothing more than
frighten the witness into silence. If a face-to-face confrontation will not
promote truth, the rationale for requiring such a confrontation is lost.62 The
balance tips in favor of protecting the child.
B. Right to be Present
Entwined with the right of a face-to-face meeting is the right of the
accused to be present at all stages of her trial.63 This right has long been
55. See, e.g., Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911); Kirby v. United
States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
56. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
57. The court in United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979),
implied that its concern over physical confrontation involved the belief that one is
more likely to be truthful when confronted by the accused.
58. Id. at 817 n.3.
59. Id. at 817.
60. Id. at 821.
61. Id.
62. See Melton, Psycholegal Issues in Child Victims' Interaction with the Legal
System, 5 VICTIMOLOGY 274, 280 (1980) (face-to-face confrontation may diminish
reliability).
63. The right to be present has been interpreted both as a Sixth Amendment
guarantee and as part of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892) (right to be present part of the right to
confront witnesses); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 128-29 (1934) ("privilege
of the accused to be present throughout his trial is of the very essence of due process")
(Roberts, J., dissenting); see Mlyniec & Dally, See No Evil? Can Insulation of Child
11
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considered an integral part of the criminal justice process since it allows the
defendant to aid in her own defense." The Supreme Court, in Faretta v.
California, emphasized that the sixth amendment "grants to the accused
personally the right to make his defense.' ' 61 According to the court in Ben-
field, "the confrontation clause contemplates the active participation of the
accused at all stages of the trial including the face-to-face meeting with the
witness. ' 66 The Benfield decision raises serious concern about the constitu-
tionality of Missouri's new law since Missouri's statute specifically permits
the child's testimony to be given outside the defendant's presence. 67 Mis-
souri's law is even more restrictive than the process employed in Benfield in
which the defendant was provided with a contemporaneous visual and aural
access to both the proceedings and his attorney. Under Missouri's statute,
although the defendant is able to review the videotape, she is unable to
directly assist her attorney at the time of the deposition. 68 In light of Benfield,
Missouri's statute may fall short of the degree of active participation envi-
sioned by the courts.
C. Cross-examination
The right to cross-examine is generally recognized as an indispensable
element of confrontation. 69 The Missouri statute recognizes this fundamental
right by providing at least two opportunities for cross-examination.70 At issue
is whether cross-examination without physical confrontation of the child is
sufficient to fulfill the trustworthiness requirement. The sixth amendment
may be violated if restrictions on the defendant's right to cross-examination
limit relevant inquiries into the defendant's guilt or innocence or the credi-
bility of the witness .7 Recent decisions suggest that it is the right of cross-
Sexual Abuse Victims Be Accomplished Without Endangering the Defendant's Con-
stitutional Rights? 40 U. MiAMI L. REV. 115, 118-24 (1985).
64. See Mlyniec & Dally, supra note 63, at 118.
65. 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).
66. 593 F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979).
67. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.685.1 (1986); see also Long v. State, 694 S.W.2d
185 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). In Long, a videotaped recording of an interview of a
twelve year-old child conducted by a rape crisis therapist was introduced at trial. The
therapist explained the videotaping procedures to the child in the presence of two
persons from the district attorney's office, but during the videotaping only the child
and the therapist were present. The court found this procedure violated the defendant's
constitutional rights and held unconstitutional article 38.071, section two, of the Texas
Criminal Procedure Code Annotated (Vernon 1986). Long, 694 S.W.2d 185.
68. Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.685 (1986). Prior to Benfield, the Supreme Court
of Missouri ruled that use of a closed circuit television to transmit the prosecution's
expert witness was permissible. Kansas City v. McCoy, 525 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1975)
(en banc).
69. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
70. Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.680.4 (1986).
71. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1974); United States v. Poe,
713 F.2d 579, 583-84 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936 (1984).
[Vol. 51
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examination which is at the heart of the confrontation clause-not the right
to a face-to-face meeting. Thus it is likely a court would find that cross-
examination alone is sufficient to satisfy the confrontation requirement with-
out the defendant's physical presence.72 According to Professor Wigmore,
the right of cross-examination "disposes of any objection based on the so-
called right of confrontation." Wigmore suggests the confrontation clause
does not require the witness and defendant meet face-to-face, rather the right
requires the witness to be present before the tribunal. 7 The court in Benfield,
however, emphasized the dual nature of physical confrontation and the right
of cross-examination. 74 According to the court, the defendant should be
allowed to "face the witness, assist his counsel, and participate in the ques-
tioning through his counsel." 71 The manner and degree of the defendant's
participation are important factors the courts must examine to determine
whether the defendant has a meaningful opportunity to assist in his or her
own defense. If the participation is too attenuated, Missouri courts may well
find the statute violates the right to an effective cross-examination.
D. Demeanor
The final function of the right to confrontation enables the jury to
evaluate the demeanor of the witness while being questioned. This is consid-
ered a fundamental part of the jury process. 6 In the landmark case, Mattox
v. United States,7 7 the Supreme Court held that the primary objective of the
confrontation clause is to guarantee cross-examination in which the witness
must "stand face-to-face with the jury in order that they may look at him,
and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives
his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.'" 8 In Barber v. Page,79 the
Court affirmed the holding of Mattox and further found the right to con-
frontation includes cross-examination and an "occasion for the jury to weigh
72. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); accord Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (The right to confront and cross-examine may in appropriate
cases bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.).
73. Wigmore believed the "ordeal of face-to-face confrontation" merged with
the principle of cross-examination. 5 J. WIGMoRE, supra note 33, § 1395, at 150-54.
The Benfield court rejected this analysis and indicated both a face-to-face meeting
and the right to cross-examine were necessary. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979).
74. 593 F.2d at 821.
75. Id. But see Jolly v. State, 681 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). The Jolly
court found the defendant's rights to confrontation and cross-examination were not
violated since the victim was available at trial. The defendant had the opportunity
to call her to the stand and chose not to do so. This analysis was specifically rejected
in Long v. State, 694 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). Missouri's statute has
specific provision for this type of belated cross-examination. See supra note 22.
76. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
77. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
78. Id. at 242-43.
79. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
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the demeanor of the witness." 8 Decisions after Barber suggest the presence
of the jury is not constitutionally required, but all agree that jury presence
remains an important part of the confrontation right.8' Under Missouri's
statute the issue is whether videotaping can adequately convey the demeanor
of the child witness. Although testimony presented on videotape is signifi-
cantly different from live testimony, the concern is whether the videotape is
sufficiently similar to live testimony to meet the requirements of the right to
confrontation. The primary concern is that videotaping may not accurately
reflect the witness' demeanor and may therefore impede the jury's deter-
mination of credibility. 2 Most of the evaluation of videotaping rests on
technical considerations. Although the medium is not inherently infirm, vi-
deotaping may be unable to capture subtle movements and discrete nuances
which often comprise an important aspect of the witness' demeanor.8 3 In
emotionally charged cases, such as sexual abuse prosecutions,8 4 videotape
may be ill-suited to reflect the emotional response which might otherwise be
very telling in live testimony.
In State v. Melendez, which involved videotaping a six year-old child-
molestation victim, the defendant challenged the ability of the videotape to
convey demeanor and reactions."5 Although the court noted this argument,
it found the defendant had not been prejudiced by the videotaped testimony. 6
Essentially the court engaged in a balancing of competing interests. The court
balanced the age of the victim, her fear of testifying, and the likelihood of
her becoming uncommunicative at trial with the fact the defendant and his
counsel were present at the videotaping and were given the opportunity to
cross-examine the witness.8 7 Cases in which the defendant is not allowed to
be personally present raise more serious questions.
80. Id. at 725.
81. See The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1, 115 (1970) (in
referring to California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), stated that "the factfinder's
observation of the witness' confrontation with the declarant is not constitutionally
required").
82. See Note, supra note 3, at 823.
83. See Comment, supra note 35, at 576.
84. Id.
85. 135 Ariz. 390, - , 661 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1982).
86. Id. at - , 661 P.2d at 657. Missouri courts have approved the use of video-
tapes noting that there is nothing inherently prejudicial in the medium. See, e.g.,
State v. Lindsey, 507 S.W.2d I (Mo. 1974) (en banc) (allowed videotaped confession);
State v. Mayhue, 653 S.W.2d 227 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (allowed videotape of witness
identifying a suspect). But see Hochneiser v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 3d 777,
208 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984). Although declining to reach the constitutionality of a
closed-circuit procedure, the court concluded closed-circuit television can affect the
jury. The camera angle can make the witness look smaller, bigger, stronger or weaker;
the use of lighting can alter demeanor; and the witness' credibility can be enhanced.
Id. at 278; see also Graham, supra note 50, at 89 (ury may infer abuse occurred if
witness too afraid to testify in open court).
87. 135 Ariz. at -, 661 P.2d at 657.
528 [Vol. 51
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III. DuE PROCESS
A. Right to a fair trial
In addition to serious questions concerning the defendant's sixth amend-
ment rights, Missouri's videotaping statute may conflict with the fundamental
right to a fair trial.88 In California v. Green, the Court noted that due process
"wholly apart from the Confrontation Clause, might prevent convictions
where a reliable evidentiary basis is totally lacking . . . ."9 The issues under
Missouri's law are two-fold: first, whether videotaping can convey the tes-
timony with sufficient accuracy to enable a jury to function properly; and
second, assuming this is possible, whether internal controls are present to
ensure the videotape is an accurate representation of the witness' testimony.
Due process prohibits the prosecutor from using any evidence against a
defendant which cannot be rationally evaluated by the jury.9 Because of the
ease with which videotape evidence may be distorted, courts may find the
evidence inherently unreliable.9' It is axiomatic: the medium changes the
message. The camera, as a substitute for the jurors' eyes, does not necessarily
reflect what might be observed in a live examination of a witness. 92 A number
of factors can alter the impressions a juror receives; lighting, camera angle,
and color all affect the jurors' impressions. 93 The evidence is subject to both
deliberate and unconscious manipulation. Lighting, for instance, can make
the witness look smaller and paler and thus more vulnerable. The choice of
color over black and white, multiple cameras over a single focus, and a fixed
camera over changing angles may all have a dramatic effect on the jury's
ability to evaluate credibility. Other technical considerations such as using
makeup on the witness, showing close-ups, employing zoom lenses, and fo-
cusing on both the defendant and the witness all may have an impact on the
jury.94 The videotape may also have less obvious ramifications. The ab-
stracting process may lessen the jury's concentration and attention span," it
may render the testimony less real, and it may reduce the jurors' feeling of
88. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. . . ." U.S. CONr.s.
amend. XIV, § 1. The due process requirement of a fair trial was extended to the
states in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
89. 399 U.S. 149, 163 n.15 (1970).
90. See Comment, supra note 35, at 583.
91. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-04 (1976).
92. See Comment, supra note 35, at 576.
93. See Kaufman, Video in the Courtroom, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1983, at 41;
Williams, Farmer, Lee, Cunaick, Howell & Rooker, Juror Perception of Trial Tes-
timony as a Function of the Method of Presentation: A Comparison of Live, Color
Video, Audio, and Transcript Presentations, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REV. 375.
94. See Comment, supra note 35, at 567-77.
95. See Brakel, Videotape in Trial Proceedings: A Technological Obsession?,
61 A.B.A. J. 956, 957 (1975).
15
Frissell-Durley: Frissell-Durley: Abandoning Trial by Ordeal
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1986
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
involvement or it may do the opposite. The impact of these factors on a
jury's decision-making process has not yet been ascertained, but the distortion
elements inherent in a videotape may prejudice an entire trial. 96 Missouri's
statute provides little guidance for preventing distortion. It mandates no
procedure for the actual videotaping and sets no standard for the technical
quality of the final product.9 7 Missouri is not alone in its failure to outline
technical standards governing the production of videotapes for use at trial.
Only two states have yet devised any comprehensive standards.98 According
to the Supreme Court of Florida, the test regarding the type of acceptable
equipment is whether the tape gives an accurate representation of what ac-
tually occurred.9 It may rest with the courts to articulate a more definitive
standard and determine what technical factors will affect the defendant's
right to a fair trial.
Another due process concern rests in the assumption that videotaped
testimony may provide the prosecutor with unique advantages.1°° These ad-
vantages may be essentially unrelated to the needs of protecting the child
witness. If the videotape is made before the trial commences, the prosecutor
has a potent weapon in plea negotiations.' 0' Furthermore, an early taping
permits the prosecutor to plan trial strategy since she is aware of the precise
nature of her chief witness' testimony. 0 2 Under Missouri's statute, however,
videotapes may be a double-edged sword. The defendant also has an op-
portunity to view the testimony and can also plan accordingly. In fact, pros-
ecutors may be reluctant to use videotaping since the tape may later be used
96. See Miller, Bender, Boster, Florence, Fontes, Hocking & Nicholson, The
Effects of Videotape Testimony in Jury Trials: Studies on Juror Decision Making,
Information Retention, and Emotional Arousal, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REv. 331.
97. Missouri courts have held that the admissibility of videotapes should be
determined by the same standard used for demonstrative evidence. E.g., State v.
Mayhue, 653 S.W.2d 227, 236 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Hudson, 521 S.W.2d
43, 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). For admissibility standards of photographs and dem-
onstrative evidence, see G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAWS OF EVIDENCE 416-
25 (1978). One commentator has suggested that the video and audio components of
the videotape should be considered separately for questions of admissibility. Note,
Videotaped Prior Identification: Evidentiary Considerations for Admissibility, 50 Mo.
L. REV. 157, 163, 172 (1985); see also, People v. Heading, 39 Mich. App. 126, 132,
197 N.W.2d 325, 329 (1972) (foundation requirements for both sound and video must
be met).
98. See Note, supra note 3, at 823. The Uniform Audio Visual Deposition
Act of 1978, 12 U.L.A. 9 (Supp. 1986) provides model guidelines. The statute has
been adopted by North Dakota, N.D. R. Civ. P. 30.1, and Virginia, VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-412.2 to -412.7 (1984).
99. Paramore v. State, 229 So. 2d 855, 859 (Fla. 1969).
100. See Note, supra note 3, at 824.
101. In Minneapolis, the police videotaped interviews with victims of child abuse
to be shown in court. Sixty defendants pled guilty as soon as they saw the interviews,
and the prosecution has not lost a single case. Videotaping: Device for Fighting Child
Abuse, 70 A.B.A. J. 36 (April 1984); see also Note, supra note 3, at 824.
102. See Note, supra note 3, at 825.
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to attack the credibility of the young witness.2 0 3 A more serious charge of
prosecutorial advantage may be levied if the prosecutor has the option of
calling the child witness to testify despite the existence of a videotape.2 4
Missouri's statute implicitly grants the prosecutor this power. This option
undermines the very purposes of the act-to protect the child from testifying
at trial and to prevent repeated interrogations. One solution may be that
once the child has testified, neither party may call the child to testify in open
court. 1o
B. Right to Public Trial
A final due process issue is whether the statute impermissibly infringes
on the right to a public trial.1° The right to a public trial is an important
criminal right which protects against governmental persecution and secret
proceedings.0 7 The rationale is basic: the state is less likely to unjustly pros-
ecute if subject to public scrutiny. Exclusion of the public has been allowed
under special circumstances which are based on compelling state interests.10 1
Missouri courts will likely find the existence of such special circumstances in
the case of the young victim/witness."09 Furthermore, the right to a public
trial is not seriously compromised by videotaping the testimony." 0 Although
the public is not present when testimony is given, the trial does not become
more "secret" since the public has a chance to view the videotape."'
103. See Berliner, supra note 12, at 101 (videotape is verbatim record which
can be used to attack credibility); Graham, supra note 50, at 90 (tapes may be used
to impeach children); Whitcomb, supra note 21, at 20 (tapes may be a liability if the
child gives conflicting information).
104. See Note, supra note 3, at 824.
105. Id. Several commentators suggest that videotaping be taken only after trial
begins to reduce the number of times a child must be questioned and lessen the charge
of prosecutorial advantage. Such a delay, however, requires the child to remember
the abuse and participate in the litigation for a longer time than pretrial videotaping.
See Bulkley, supra note 18, at 664; Note, supra note 3, at 824.
106. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a ...
public trial . . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. Defendant's right to a public trial was
extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257 (1948).
107. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270
(1948).
108. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (absent ov-
erriding interest, the trial in a criminal case must be open to the public); Gannett
Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
109. In balancing the defendant's sixth amendment right of public trial against
the child's difficulty in testifying, courts have frequently upheld exclusionary orders.
See, e.g., State v. Santos, 122 R.I. 799, 413 A.2d 58 (1980); State v. Gee, 262 S.C.
373, 204 S.E.2d 727 (1974).
110. See Note, supra note 3, at 819.
111. See Barber & Bates, Videotape in Criminal Proceedings, 25 HASTINGs L.J.
1017, 1036-37 (1974).
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IV. EVALUATION
The basic premise underlying Missouri's statute is protection of a young
victim from a second victimization in the litigation process. Collective shock
at instances of sexual abuse of young children has led to a desire to find
pragmatic solutions. In cases where fundamental rights are involved the state
may prevail only upon showing the statute is necessary for the accomplish-
ment of a compelling state interest."12 As the preceding discussion reveals,
Missouri's videotaping statute does address a compelling interest, but it is
subject to charges that it is not narrowly drawn.
A. Overinclusive
The statute is arguably overinclusive since it may apply to a broader
group of victims than is necessary." 3 The statute provides for the videotaping
of testimony of witnesses under seventeen years of age," '4 and in light of the
goal to protect children from the trauma of testifying in court, the age
limitation appears to exceed the purpose of the legislation." 5 This argument
is unpersuasive since the act requires the court to evaluate each case and
allows videotaping only in extraordinary circumstances."16 Age is only one
factor the court must consider in assessing the psychological harm which
may result from requiring live testimony."17 In balancing the rights of the
defendant with the needs of the witness, the court must not only consider
the biological age of the victim but must also consider a host of emotional
and environmental factors which may influence the victim/witness' ability to
face the accused and provide in-court testimony." 8 An inexperienced, im-
mature seventeen-year-old may suffer more emotional damage from testifying
in open court than a victim who is considerably younger."19 The statute is
drafted to protect specific members of the entire class of children. The leg-
islature recognized that while not all members of the class need special pro-
tection, the same safeguards should be available to all members of the class.
B. Underinclusive
The converse is, of course, that the statute is underinclusive since it does
not protect all the victims of crime who are shown to have special needs.
112. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 608
(1982).
113. See Bulkley, supra note 18, at 649-50 (stressing the wisdom of limiting the
use of evidentiary and procedural innovations to very "special" cases).
114. 1985 Mo. Legis. Serv. ch. 573.050, § 8 (Vernon).
115. See Note, supra note 1, at 1017.
116. See Bulkley, supra note 18, at 649.
117. 1985 Mo. Legis. Serv. ch. 573.050, § 9.2 (Vernon).
118. See Bulkley, supra note 18, at 647.
119. Id. at 650.
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Age alone does not guarantee a victim protection from the psychological
trauma which can result from testifying in court.' 2° However, the constitu-
tional rights of the defendant require the use of videotaping to be restricted
to special cases in which the balancing clearly favors the needs of the victim/
witness over the rights of the defendant. No one seriously contends the
legislation can provide protection for all citizens; instead the legislation is
designed to protect a special class which is largely without adequate protec-
tion.12 1
V. CONCLUSION
'As in other sciences, so in politics, it is impossible that all things should
be precisely set down in writing; for enactments must be universal, but
actions are considered with particulars.'
Aristotle
The desire to protect children from the ordeal of testifying in court in the
presence of individuals who may be responsible for horrifying acts of abuse
motivates this legislation governing videotaping. Missouri's law is not a legal
panacea to the problem of child abuse prosecutions, but it is a prudent
attempt to provide protection for innocent children while maintaining pro-
cedural safeguards which guarantee the defendant's constitutional right to a
fair trial. Under the provisions of this statute the rights of the accused are
not seriously undermined. The statute is flexible enough to allow for a case
by case assessment of the rights and interests of both parties. The statute
should be applied only when it is clearly shown that the child will suffer
significant harm if forced to testify in court or in the presence of the defend-
ant and when the defendant's ability to present his case is not jeopardized
by the videotaping procedure. In light of the conflicting interests at stake,
the statute's approach is the only realistic method of protecting the interests
of the child, the accused, and the state. Nevertheless, the court must heed
caution when applying this procedure and must temper its zeal for protecting
children and its abhorrence of child sexual abuse with the fear of committing
another outrage-impermissibly infringing on the constitutional rights of the
accused.
COLLY J. FRISSELL-DURLEY
120. Id. at 647 (It is unclear what aspects of the legal process cause the greatest
trauma.).
121. See McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice:
The Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CR, . L. REV. 649, 662 (1976) ("Victims and
witnesses do not receive even a fraction of the protection and defenses that are
afforded an accused.").
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